

Wg K put in minutes

Oct 5, 1987

Hypo: K's tactic (means) was "clever-crazy" -
to keep deployment secret from US public
till after minutes operation, by timing
it so minutes would break up right after election,
and to delay Pres' conclusion that they were present
till soon before election, counting on

1) Pres' unwilling to reveal the former
first lady election (Hornick, quoted in Libero)

2) " " " to study " " " about
public power

3) later, Pres' maneuvers of minutes

4) after election, Pres' unwillingness to strike
at missiles

He may not have control on leaks to Repubs from
Intell Com — didn't realize JFK couldn't control leaks!

[Hyp: de Vries to McCone to Keating]

or, on pressure from the Republics despite

without the presence - or, without books - would
VFK have - made these

- revealed deployment 3 weeks before election
or, till after operational?! see PSACM

But the "clim" approach (which right Sam wanted) was also "crazily reckless." What if it didn't work? Did Sam think this through, any more than R thought through ICG? (or, was encouraged to do so by Pam. or Ruth?).
DPP. (or hopeful better: look only at benefit).

[Was very & description a "tribute" to / reflection of
expectation / fear that CS might act illegally /
aggressing if ~~risks~~ were known (to public) while
most undesirable

Hyp: on CII

on 17 Oct draft SNIE

Hyp: low notes of Berlin
[little notes of election]

my fear he want to deton US action on
missiles if & when they were discovered —

by hinting Berlin was hostage for Cuban SSMS

(as JFK believed: but he claimed

to be ready to risk hostages: esp. on

Oct 16 (was he not?)

but until Oct 27 (check Cordia's
play — meant)

c.o. maybe no plan to initiate pressure on Berlin
after SSMS is plan

— as I thought at the time (and JFK?)

and in 1964

this was deton! possibly. "bluff"

yet, once SSMS is plan; if he got any with
it, and effort on NATO was good for SU —
he could have pressured Berlin!

— (I thought this would have risken a US
move vs. Cuba! Negotial etc would
work both ways!

and SU would then have a big stake
in Cuba, to be lost! (We could capture
or destroy a large part of his MRBM/IRBM stuff!)

6 Feb 89

(bstr 23 Aug 62)

[^{Hyp:} Reason minutes were "unacceptable";
 then SAMs (+ MiGs) — but much more, SSMS —
 blocked US invasion, by posing unacceptable risks;

then, and to back the out before the became
 operational — deadline — because it was last
 chance (as well as best excuse, even: not
available later!) to invade,

or to keep open the option of invading
 (being gotten the out of air strike, mongoose attack (!)
 or threat — not of ^{anti-}invasion pledge, which was
not discussed!

This would be like effort of prospect of
MiGs in 1961 on the deadline for (and, intention to
 carry out) By of Pigs!

"After MiGs deployed (Cuban pilots), option of
 invasion of exiles became more costly, risky, difficult
 or unavailable. Then, deadline"

MiGs precluded pure — after invasion,
 as SSMs " US invasion!

We know, now, 1) there was US intent i, prob for,
invasion option, i never then

(whether to cap Mongoose,

or to preclude low buildup

(if latter: SU "determined" forces
 were potentially waiting attack,
 like US ships at Pearl Harbor, plans
 at Phils; yet, unlike latter, did
 (yet = fast enough to) detect attack,
 or thinking not on Cuba.

2) SSMS, ~~operation~~, was agreed by US as detent.

(This prospect could have invited attack — if there was a motus to invade.

see Taylor memo, May 1962: to win, Moynihan needs US involvement

(esp after see hiring & troops in Ag;
see 7 Ag memo, CIA)

[Why didn't some decide this help help as defence against invasion? Did they?

4st 23 Ag: SU more would signal arrival of another signing

[which McG B, JFK & McN would agree! "barely" Nitge VCS would not; esp., as incredible.

He did believe this in 1961! ST Talbot

Answer: Do we acknowledge this, in action, does?

JFK: yes ; McG, others: no (not yet)

(not this way:
e.g. of Thailand)

Thus, a concern of US, was mentioned:

To prevent Cuba from regaining the
means — or effective alliance with SU — that
would block the invasion or airstrike
we were actively, secretly, preparing as an
option and as a threat, a form of pressure
and practicing, as

in Vietnam and elsewhere;

a potential culmination to MongOOSE

(see all the occasions mentioned of McN on Oct 4 —

including US horizontal esc, to protect Berlin;

(saf the carrying out FU threats — which

McN made but was determined not to carry out;

note, even in full '62 about Berlin!

US

(i.e. because we were concerned about Berlin,
we didn't want our threat of attack on
Cuba blocked — we needed that option!

That was one way, minors in Cuba could
understand our position on Berlin!

And how: (Did K think of that?)

What was K plan for Berlin? (Tushnet's question)

How did he keep mentioning it!

What does Thompson say?!

269-70 Note, in 1987: US still talking of importance of
an agreement — or not — not to involve!

(Invasion as a "option," (can we have a right
to choose!))